Introduction
Continued from here.
The introduction states the two main theses of the book and gives a brief summary of each of the chapters.
The two main theses are: (1) Unconstrained reasoning leads to radical choices and (2) Such radical choices are hard to extricate ourselves from.
The book has two main parts: an account of the various dangers that result when the ideals of reason are fully pursued (Chapters 2 to 4) and suggestions on how reason can be prevented from disgracing itself (Chapters 5 to 7 ).
For the first part of the book, we are given an account of how unconstrained reasoning leads to:
paradox and incoherence (Chapter 2);
dialectical illusions of either an absolutist or relativist flavour (Chapter 3);
a skepticism that closes down the rational enterprise altogether (Chapter 4).
There are two ways that unconstrainted reasoning leads to radical, stark, compelling and apparently mutually exclusive “either X or Y†choices. In Fogelin’s words:
“Reason, pursued without constraint, tends to drive us in one of two contrasting directions. The first is the way of metaphysics, which at least in its traditional form, is an attempt to produce a purely rational account of the unchanging, underlying structure of reality. The second contrasting tendency is for reason, when driven to its limits, to undercut itself, yielding radical skepticism or radical relativism.â€
On dealing with such choices, Fogelin writes:
“The point of this work is not to offer guidance in making such choices, but to try and understand how they arise, and how, if at all, we can extricate ourselves from them. A central thesis of this work is that such radical choices emerge when reason us given unrestricted employment. A further thesis is that extrication from these choices can be difficult and perhaps, in some cases, never completely successful. These choices generate what Wittgenstein calls “deep disquietudes.†They do so by placing us in the following paradoxical position: The very act of taking such a radical choice seriously walls us off from just those considerations that could extricate us from it. Furthermore, it does not help to tell this to someone wrestling with a radical choice. To him or her, any such suggestion will sound shallow, question-begging, self-sealing, or, as William James would put it, like a “shuffling evasion.†This built-in resistance virtually guarantees that no treatment of the anxieties generated by a radical choice is likely to seem fully satisfactory to anyone deeply immersed in it. One possible strategy is to draw a comparison with some other radical choice that the person does not find compelling. Perhaps by exhibiting the underlying similarity between Lewis’s choice (Boon’s comments: Either something is certain or nothing is even probable) and Dostoyevsky’s choice (Boon’s comments: Either there is God or everything is morally permissible), we can break the spell of someone’s obsession with Lewis’s choice; Dostoyevsky, Satre, and Nietzsche may not be a crowd with which that person wishes to associate. Unfortunately the opposite can also happen: Our subject may, for the first time, take Dostoyevsky’s choice seriously, thus doubling his or her troubles. Contagion spreads.”
[This post consists mostly of material taken directly from the book.]
Next post on the book here.





